Free Flight or Free Fall by Lawter, Allison K.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 62 | Issue 3 Article 14
1997
Free Flight or Free Fall
Allison K. Lawter
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law
and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allison K. Lawter, Free Flight or Free Fall, 62 J. Air L. & Com. 915 (1997)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol62/iss3/14
FREE FLIGHT OR FREE FALL?
ALLISON K. LAWTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM .......................... 917
A. THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM ............... 917
B. PROBLEMS AND COMPLAINTS .................... 918
II. THE COMPONENTS OF FREE FLIGHT .......... 921
A. FREE FLIGHT DEFINED .......................... 923
B. PROTECTED AND ALERT ZONES .................. 924
C. AIRCRAFT-AIRCRAFT SEPARATION STANDARDS ..... 926
D. SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE .......................... 927
E. OTHER ASPECTS OF AVIATION ................... 928
1. Pre-Flight Planning .......................... 928
2. Collaborative Decision-Making ................ 929
3. Controlled Time of Arrival ........ * ......... 929
4. Handling Uncertainty in Arrival Rates ........ 930
5. Terminal and Approach ...................... 931
F. THE TECHNOLOGY .............................. 932
G. IMPLEMENTING FREE FLIGHT .................... 935
H. THE NATIONAL ROUTE PROGRAM ............... 936
III. THE FREE FLIGHT DEBATE ..................... 940
A. BENEFITS ....................................... 940
B. CONCERNS ABOUT FREE FLIGHT ................. 942
C. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ............... 947
D. QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY ........................ 950
1. Pilot Liability ................................ 950
2. Liability of Air Traffic Control ............... 952
3. Manufacturer's Liability ...................... 953
IV. WHAT NEXT? CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND
QUESTIONS ....................................... 954
915
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
N 1995, outdated equipment at several U.S. air traffic controlcenters has fal red at least one doz n times.' While no maj r
incidents resulted, the equipment failures highlighted many
problems facing aviation in the United States today.
For example, the suspect equipment is outdated-the oldest
equipment still uses vacuum tubes and has been in use since
World War 11.2 Not only is the technology outdated, but many
claim the system of air traffic management currently employed
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is highly ineffi-
cient. As one pilot stated, the inefficiency of the system is "liter-
ally strangling the aviation industry," despite ample unused
airspace and runway capacity.3
Further, as the system falters, demand for carrier services is
increasing. Within the next ten years, air traffic in the United
States is expected to increase dramatically by sixty percent, to
800 million passengers per year.4 Everyone from pilots and con-
trollers to FAA administrators seems to agree: the nation's sys-
tem of air traffic management needs help.5
In an historic move, the industry, including commercial air-
lines and general aviation, has come to the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration for new services and benefits rather than
programs.6 As the industry struggles,7 the FAA has recognized
the need for more efficient services to meet increasing de-
mand.' It is no surprise, then, that the idea that planes may be
I J. Lynn Lunsford, FAA Plan May Extend Pilot Control; But Routing Proposal
Raises Safety Question, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 24, 1995, at IA, 30A.
2 Eric Malnic, FAA Plans to Put Air Traffic Control on New Flight Path, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1995, at Al.
s William B. Cotton, Captain, Free Flight in Domestic ATM, J. AIR TRAFFIC CON-
TROL, Jan.-Mar. 1995, at 10.
4 Lunsford, supra note 1, at 30A.
5 Malnic, supra note 2, at Al. Michael Goldfarb, former FAA Chief of Staff, has
stated there is a 30-40% inefficient use of air space. News: 10:31 p.m. ET (CNN
television broadcast, Mar. 29, 1996) (transcript no. 1315-5) (interview with
Michael Goldfarb).
6 Bruce D. Nordwall, "Cultural" Shift Key to New Concept, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 31, 1995, at 40.
7 As of August 1993, the airline industry was $35 billion in debt. U.S. Panel
Recommends Tax, Regulatory Relief DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 160, at G-1, G-2
(Aug. 20, 1993) (discussion of the tax and regulatory relief suggested in 1993 by
the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry); see
also Planzer &Jenny, infra note 191, at 18.
8 Perry Bradley, Free Flight, Bus. & COM. AVIATION, June 1995, at 90.
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able to fly faster, more direct routes while burning less fuel has
turned more than a few heads.9
The idea is called Free Flight. This Comment offers an intro-
duction to the ideas surrounding free flight and several issues
involved with its implementation. Part I provides an introduc-
tion to the present system of air traffic control and its problems.
The details of free flight, its components, and its benefits are
discussed in Part II. Finally, Part III looks at concerns regarding
free flight, potential liability problems, and unanswered
questions.
I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Ti NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
The system employed by the Federal Aviation Administration
today is possibly the safest air traffic management system in the
world.10 There are serious doubts, however, as to its efficiency.
Until recently, these doubts have not been addressed because
the system is "unfailingly safe," and accidents such as midair col-
lisions are so unlikely to occur that the FAA has resisted any
major overhaul. 1
The last significant changes to air traffic control in the United
States occurred in the 1980s, when the FAA determined the saf-
est approach to managing the high volume of air traffic in the
United States involved tight control of air traffic by confining
planes to designated, well-defined airways. 12 This system, the
National Airspace System, revolves around "preferred routing,"
which allows for controlled ordering and separation of
aircraft.' s
Under the National Airspace System, all movement by air traf-
fic is carefully monitored and structured. 4 Carriers, through
9 William J. McGee, Getting There Faster and Cheaper; The National Route Prgram,
AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Sept. 1995, at 46.
10 News: 8:30 a.m. ET (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 10, 1995) (transcript no.
130-10) (interview with Monte Belger, associate administrator for air traffic serv-
ices for the FAA) [hereinafter CNN Broadcast].
11 Free-for-All in the Skies, FORTUNE, May 29, 1995, at 22.
12 Hearing on Free Flight: FAA Stymied by High-Tech Advances Before the Subcomm. on
Employment, Housing, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1994) (prepared testimony of William F. Jeffers, associ-
ate administrator for air traffic, FAA).
19 Id.
14 Mike Ball et al., Is Free Flight Feasible? Results From Initial Simulations, J. AiR
TRAFFIc CONTROL, Jan.-Mar. 1995, at 14.
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the pilot or an air carrier dispatch office, are directed to follow a
preferred flight route. 15 By assigning preferred routes, air traf-
fic controllers are able to maintain a consistent and ordered
structure in the skies and at airports, which makes it easier for
the system to continue separation standards and therefore safe
and, in theory, efficient operations.16 Planes today are often
separated by 1000 feet vertically, and by five miles horizontally.' 7
On any flight, pilots must follow the strict routes designated
by air traffic control, checking with, and being monitored by,
controllers along the way.' The air traffic controllers on the
ground actually have the last word on every aspect of a plane's
flight, such as when the plane takes off, at what altitude it flies,
what speed the plane travels, if and when turns are made, and
when and from what direction to land.1 9
The system basically performs two functions, as explained to
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government
Operations: (1) separation of aircraft, and (2) traffic flow man-
agement, or ordering aircraft in a landing sequence the airport
can accommodate.20 At some airports, aircraft are lined up as
far away as 500 miles from the flight's destination in order to
prevent "traffic jams" caused by too many planes converging on
the airport at once2
B. PROBLEMS AND COMPLAINTS
The current system is not without its critics. The main com-
plaint is that the system, although safe, is terribly inefficient.2 2
Air traffic control inefficiency is blamed on the inflexibility and
rigid separation standards inherent in the system.23 The Air
Transport Association has claimed this discourages industry
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Lunsford, supra note 1, at IA.
18 Alfonso Chardy, Future of Air Travel May Ride on "Free Flight"; Pilots to Determine
Routes, Altitudes, Speeds, PHOENIX GAZETrE, Sept. 21, 1995, at A16.
19 Id.
20 Hearing on Free Flight: FAA Stymied by High Tech Advances Before the Subcomm. on
Employment, Housing, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1994) (prepared testimony of Captain William B. Cot-
ton, manager, air traffic and flight systems, United Airlines) [hereinafter Cotton
testimony].
21 Lunsford, supra note 1, at 30A.
22 Free-for-All in the Skies, supra note 11, at 22.
23 Industry Says Free Flight Technology Could Save Airlines Billions a Year, DAiLY REP.
FOR EXECUTVES, Aug. 10, 1994, at 152.
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growth, and if air traffic continues to be managed under the
current system, it will run out of capacity to handle growing de-
mand.2 4 As noted above, air traffic is expected to increase by
sixty percent, to 800 million passengers per year, by 2005.25
One problem leading to the system's inefficiency is the out-
dated equipment currently in use. The radar units employed by
the National Airspace System are "expensive to build, expensive
to maintain, expensive to fix, and expensive to protect from the
weather," and the range can be blocked by buildings, moun-
tains, or other obstacles.2 6 Reportedly, many of the computers
in the system are so outdated they still use vacuum tubes. 7 Re-
placement parts are hard to come by and, on occasion, have
only been found in the Czech Republic and Poland.2
Congress recently heard testimony comparing air traffic con-
trol equipment in use in the United States with that of other
nations. 9 One example stated that the tiny nation of Fiji has
one of the most up-to-date systems, which use personal com-
puters.30 These computers incorporate and display data trans-
missions from airborne data processors, then calculate the
aircraft's exact location with the help of signals from Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellites.3 1 In comparison, the
United States system seems to restrict air traffic rather than use
available technology to expand airspace capacity and improve
safety for National Airspace System users.3 2
In fact, the Federal Aviation Administration has had trouble
developing and implementing modernization programs.33
These programs have stalled and have been discarded many
times in recent decades.3 4 In the meantime, nations such as
Great Britain and Germany have purchased and installed air
24 Id.
25 See supra text accompanying note 4.
26 Malnic, supra note 2, at Al.
27 Peter J. Howe, Outdated Air Traffic System Awaits Overhaul, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 14, 1995, at 1.
28 Id.
2 See Federal Aviation Administration Revitalization Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R
2276 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transportation and Infra-
structure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1995) (statement of James K Coyne, Presi-




39 Malnic, supra note 2, at Al.
s4 Id.
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traffic control equipment more sophisticated than that in use in
the National Airspace System.35 Often, such equipment was de-
veloped in the United States, indicating that the technology is
readily available. 6
But the system itself, not just the technology, is out of date.
Although safe, the National Airspace System is incapable of ab-
sorbing projected demand.3 7 "The delays, congestion, and in-
convenience resulting from this are obvious, well documented,
and are experienced by millions of consumers each year."3 8
There are also unseen impacts such as slowed economic growth,
unemployment, decreased productivity, and increased pollution
from excess flying.3 9
By following preferred air traffic control routes instead of di-
rect routes, planes use extra fuel.4° Established routes are over-
crowded, using more fuel and causing delays.4 ' Also, because
planes adhering to the paths cannot fly straight to their destina-
tions, planes must fly single file for the duration of a flight,
often stuck between slower planes for thousands of miles.42 One
critic compared this to a "Corvette behind an 18-wheeler in a
no-passing zone."43
In the end, the function of separating aircraft has been over-
come by the process of lining up aircraft for arrival.' In ex-
treme instances, critics suggest, "aircraft bound for New York
are literally getting in line while still flying over the Pacific
Northwest."45 This process of sequencing planes for arrival at
airports is a particular problem at busy "hub" airports, as con-
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 Hearing on Free Fight: FAA Stymied ly High-Tech Advances Before the Subcomm. on
Employment, Housing and Aviation of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1994) (prepared statement of Captain R. Michael
Baiada, RMB Associates; Michael J. Boyd, president, Aviation Systems Research
Corp.; and Norman W. Wafts).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Malnic, supra note 2, at Al.
41 Id.
42 Morning Edition: Airlines Call for More Efficient Use of Airspace (NPR radio
broadcast, Aug. 22, 1995) [hereinafter NPR Broadcast].
43 Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.




trollers often sequence flights at slow, gas-guzzling speeds before
allowing them to land.46
As the critics' complaints grow louder, the FAA has begun to
move toward changing the system. This change is motivated by
lost profits in the industry.47 Restricted to established paths be-
tween slower planes, waiting in line to take off and land, and
circling airports, airlines are losing money.48 Resulting delays
correlate to missed connections and related costs, such as re-
booking passengers on other flights, overtime pay for employ-
ees, and extra maintenance.4 9
The cost of these inefficiencies depends on the individual air
carriers,50 but most costs are in the form of burned fuel.51 Be-
cause many of its flights are not allowed to take the most direct,
efficient route, United Airlines has estimated the airline's reve-
nues are cut by approximately $1 billion a year.52 The airline
further estimates the cost of flying at inefficient altitudes, wait-
ing at airports, and circling runways costs the airline $670 mil-
lion annually.53  Air traffic managers at American Airlines
believe that on some routes, American Airlines planes fly twenty
percent farther than necessary.54
II. THE COMPONENTS OF FREE FLIGHT
Out of these criticisms has grown the idea of "free flight."
This concept was born from the idea that significant improve-
ments to the air traffic control system can be made. 55 Simply,
free flight will allow pilots (and airlines) to fly "when they want
to and where they want to." 6
Free flight is not a new concept. Some involved with the de-
velopment of free flight claim the idea has been around for
46 WALL ST.J. REP., FAA May Let Airlines Set Own Flight Paths, TAMPA TRIB., Aug.
8, 1995, at 1.
47 Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.
48 Id.
49 See Bill Sweetman, Accelerating the ATC Revolution; Air Traffic Control, AIR
TRANSPORT WORLD, May 1995, at 57; Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.
mo See Industy Says Free Flight Technology Could Save Airlines Billions a Year, supra
note 23.
51 Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.
52 Free-for-All in the Skies, supra note 11, at 22.
53 FAA May Let Airlines Set Own Flight Paths, supra note 46, at 1.
54 Free-for-All in the Skies, supra note 11, at 22.
55 CNN Broadcast, supra note 10.
56 Id.
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years, but has only now caught on." The real impetus for
change occurred when United Airlines captain R. Michael
Baiada and Denver-based aviation consultant Michael Boyd au-
thored a highly critical report on the current air traffic control
system, which inspired congressional hearings in August 1994.8
Specifically, the hearing addressed complaints that the FAA was
dragging its heels in improving the current system of air traffic
control, and that attention was not properly focused on issues of
air traffic management.5 9
Since the congressional hearing, free flight has made signifi-
cant and rapid advances. Specifically, the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration has expanded and accelerated what is now the
National Route Program (NRP), and has developed a plan to
adapt the National Airspace System for free flight.60
To further the study of free flight, in October 1994, a twenty-
three member committee was formed through the Radio Tech-
nical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), a non-profit com-
pany charged by the government and aviation industry "to
develop navigation, control and communications standards."6'
FAA officials and representatives from the airlines, pilots' and
controllers' unions, general aviation, civilian contractors, and
the Department of Defense comprised the committee mem-
bers.6" To the surprise of many, this committee quickly pro-
duced a concise, unanimous directive for free flight,63 complete
with specific recommendations.' This thirty-five page white pa-
per was presented to former FAA Director David Hinson in Jan-
uary 1995.65
57 See Cotton, supra note 3, at 10.
58 Sweetman, supra note 49, at 57; see generally Hearing on Free Flight: FAA Stymied
by High-Tech Advances Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Housing, and Aviation of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1994).
59 Hearing on Free Flight: FAA Stymied by High-Tech Advances Before the Subcomm. on
Employment, Housing, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1994) (prepared testimony of J. Roger Fleming, senior
vice president, operations and services, Air Transport Association of America)
[hereinafter Fleming testimony].
60 Sweetman, supra note 49, at 57.
61 Id.; see also Bradley, supra note 8, at 90.
62 Bradley, supra note 8, at 90; Sweetman, supra note 49, at 57.
65 RTCA, INC., REPORT OF THE RTCA BOARD OF DIREcTORs' SELECT COMMITTEE
ON FREE FLIGHT (1995) (available from RTCA, Inc., 1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.,
Suite 1020, Washington, D.C. 20036-4001, telephone: (202)833-9339, facsimile:
(202)833-9434) [hereinafter RTCA COMMITTEE REPORT].
64 Sweetman, supra note 49, at 57.
65 Bradley, supra note 8, at 90.
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The FAA endorsed the suggestions of the RTCA committee
and an executive committee, RTCA Task Force 3, formed at the
request of Hinson in April 1995.66 Hinson specifically asked the
task force to provide an implementation strategy identifying ex-
pected user benefits, oudining changes in procedures, and rec-
ommending appropriate technology.6 7
Task Force 3 submitted the results of its study of free flight to
Hinson in October 1995." The Final Report provides a de-
tailed, technical free flight implementation plan with recom-
mendations for the near-term (through 1997), mid-term (1998
through 2000), and far-term (2001 and beyond).69
One publication reported that Hinson called the task force
report "first-class." 70 Tony Broderick, FAA Associate Administra-
tor for Regulation and Certification, said, "We agree in principle
with the recommendations."7
1
A. FREE FLIGHT DEFINED
What is Free Flight?72 The RTCA defines free flight as:
A safe and efficient flight operating capability under instru-
ment flight rules (IFR) in which the operators have the freedom
to select their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions
are only imposed to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding
airport capacity, to prevent unauthorized flight through special
use airspace, and to ensure safety of flight. Restrictions are lim-
ited in extent and duration to correct the identified problem.
Any activity which removes restrictions represents a move toward
free flight.73
Task Force 3 expanded this definition to explain free flight as a
concept encompassing the complete range of operation so that
the benefits of free flight extend to ground movement and pre-
flight activities.74 The definition of free flight promulgated by
6 Sweetnan, supra note 49, at 57.
67 RTCA, INC., FNAL REPORT OF RTCA TASK FORCE 3: FREE FLIGHT IMPLEMEN-
TATION (1995) (available from RTCA, Inc., 1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite
1020, Washington, D.C. 20036-4001, telephone: (202) 833-9339, facsimile: (202)
833-9434)) [hereinafter TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT].
68 See generally id.
69 Id.
70 Industry Task Force Report Is "First Class", AIR SAFE-rY WK., Jan. 1, 1996, at 1.
71 Id.
72 For a succinct introduction to free flight, see Free Flight Introduction (visited
Sept. 22, 1996) <http://asd.orlab.faa.gov/files/freeflgtintro.htm>.
73 RTCA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.
74 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 19.
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the task force includes: "free flowing, improvements in con-
cepts and operations to plan and maintain flight predictability;
free filing, improvements in concepts and operations of flight
planning; and, free flying, improvements in concepts and opera-
tions of flight maneuvering."75
The basic idea of free flight, however, means the pilot or car-
rier dispatcher will be able to pick the route, speed, and altitude
at which they want to fly, although still notifying air traffic con-
trol of their intentions.76 The only instance where air traffic
controllers will interfere with a pilot's flexibility will be when:
(1) a plane's operation may interfere with another aircraft's op-
erations; (2) traffic at airports or congested airspace prevents
the safe use of free flight; (3) an aircraft will fly into special use
airspace; and (4) safety of flight restrictions are deemed neces-
sary by controllers." The RTCA also foresees instances where
the pilot, not air traffic controllers, will take on separation assur-
ance. 7' The task force report makes clear, however, that the air
traffic service provider (air traffic control) "is always the ruling
entity in separation arbitration."79
B. PROTECTED AND ALERT ZONES
Free flight is built around the idea of two zones of airspace,
protected and alert.8" The size of each zone is dependant on
the aircraft's size, speed, characteristics, and equipment.8 1 The
smaller zone is the protected zone. Under free flight, the pro-
tected zones of aircraft must never touch, let alone overlap. 2
The size of an aircraft's protected zone is a direct reflection of
the accuracy of its position determination." The alert zone ex-
tends beyond the protected zone and is used to indicate a po-
tential situation where intervention may be necessary.8 4
The size of a plane's alert zone is based on "look ahead time,"
and the alert zone is the set of all potential protected zones of
75 Id.
76 Id. at 1.
77 RTCA COMMirTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 7.
78 Id.
79 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 25.
80 RTCA COMMi-rEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 7. For a visual description of
protected and alert zones in airborne free flight, see Free Flight Vuual (visited
Sept. 22, 1996) <http://asd.orlab.faa.gov/files/visual.htm>.
81 RTCA COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 8.
82 Id.
83 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 29.
8 RTCA COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 8.
924
FREE FLIGHT
the aircraft at that look ahead time. 5 The task force's report
defines look ahead time as "a comfortable-not minimal-
budget that allows for worse-than average human and systemic
responses," and may vary with the air traffic when a plane is in
flight.8 6
When an aircraft's alert zone is clear of the alert zone of other
aircraft, that plane is free to maneuver at will.8 7 If an aircraft
makes any change in course, altitude, or speed, that information
is sent via data link (a network of ground, air, and airborne com-
munications systems) to the air traffic management system for
planning purposes.ss If alert zones come in contact, the air traf-
fic management system will assess the situation and offer adviso-
ries or instructions as needed. 9
The task force identified one conceptual problem with this
system: if look ahead times are measured in minutes, and
planes are allowed to maneuver at will, then each aircraft's alert
zone has the potential to be very large.90 As a result, there may
be a considerable number of alerts. One solution offered by the
task force is to establish "rules of the road" whereby some limita-
tions may be placed on the maneuverability of aircraft until the
end state of free flight is accomplished. 91 In the meantime,
planes will be required to transmit their intent at a specified
rate, while maneuvering planes may be required to transmit
such intent at a higher rate.92 Planes lacking instantaneous
transmission capabilities will not be permitted to free fly.9 3
The minimum separation requirements in this concept are
dependent on the equipment of the aircraft.94 In such an in-
stance, the concept of protected and alert zones will be adjusted
mathematically for the particular aircraft's capabilities.9 5 In any
85 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 30.
86 Id.
87 RTCA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 8.
88 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 30.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 31.
92 Id.
93 Id.
9 Id. at 30; see also Bruce D. Nordwall, Free Flight: ATC Model for the Next 50
Years, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,July 31, 1995, at 38, 39 ("[a] factor in the size
of both zones will be the aircraft's communication, navigation, and surveillance
equipment").
95 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 30.
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event, the human factors associated with aircraft separation
need to be addressed.96
C. AIRCRAFT-AIRCRAFT SEPARATION STANDARDS
In the present system, aircraft are separated from each other
by as much as 1000 feet vertically and five miles horizontally.97
Reducing these separation standards to provide for more effi-
cient use of the National Airspace was one of the primary goals
discussed by the RTCA Select Committee.9 Task Force 3 also
discussed reduction of separation standards as critical to the im-
plementation of free flight.99 The significance of reducing sepa-
ration standards is that more aircraft will be able to use the same
amount of airspace, and there will be a reduced number of alert
zone conflicts, thus reducing restrictions on aircraft
maneuverability. 100
The task force Final Report explained the result of reduction
in separation standards by discussing informal studies done for
the RTCA task force.101 The example provided in the task
force's report assumes the current standards are reduced to
three nautical miles horizontally and 1000 feet vertically (3
nmi/1000 ft.). The studies demonstrated "that given the same
population and routes of flight, this reduction engenders a de-
crease in the number of aircraft to aircraft conflicts to about 1/3
the current number."1 02
One problem with these studies is that the increased workload
on air traffic controllers by more compressed air traffic is not
reflected.1 3 The task force makes clear that separation stan-
dards will not be reduced so as to compromise safety, nor will
the overall stress and workload of controllers be increased
unreasonably. 10 4
The ultimate goal of the RTCA task force is to reduce separa-
tion standards between aircraft to one nautical mile horizontally
and 1000 feet vertically.10 5 The same studies suggested a de-
96 Id.
97 Lunsford, supra note 1, at IA.
98 See generally RTCA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 63.
99 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 34.
10 Id.; see discussion supra part II.B.
101 See TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 34-35.





crease in conflicts to one-ninth the current number with this
standard, provided the reductions are safely made.1 0 6 The risk
of such reductions and the cost of new equipment to enable
such separation reductions must be balanced, however, against
the benefit of such reductions.
10 7
D. SPEClAL USE AIRSPACE
One challenge facing free flight is restrictions on Special Use
Airspace (SUA). Special Use Airspace is explained as "airspace
that has been set aside for the principal use of the military for
aircraft and other airborne operations (such as missile test-
ing)." 108 When Special Use Airspace is not in use for its in-
tended purpose, it is "released" during certain times for use by
civil aviation. 10 9
The necessity of such designated airspace is legitimate. Mili-
tary aircraft often do not fly directly from one point to another,
but in unpredictable flight paths at high speeds."l 0 Also, such
operations and missile testing could seriously endanger civil air-
craft in the area."1 As a consequence, civil aviation is routed
around SUAs.
Task Force 3 also addressed the issue of Special Use Airspace
and its impact on free flight. The task force emphasized the
benefits of increasing access to SUA, such as "more flexibility in
planning and operating flights to meet specific objectives of air-
space users." 1 The task force's suggestions include the cooper-
ation of the FAA and the Department of Defense, as well as
airspace users, to determine how SUAs may be better used by
civil aviation when not in use by the military."1
3
The primary problem with limited use of Special Use Airspace
now is that civil aviation often does not know when SUA is avail-
able for their use."14 Currently, such information is not commu-
nicated to those who need the information to make flight plans,
106 Id.
107 Id. at 36.





112 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 36.
113 Id.
114 Hart, supra note 108, at 20.
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specifically air traffic controllers and pilots.'15 The task force
recommends a real-time notification system between the Depart-
ment of Defense and the FAA and, finally, between the FAA and
pilots.116
E. OTHER ASPECTS OF AVIATION
Task Force 3 sees free flight "as a broad concept extending
throughout the en route and terminal airspace that permits
maximum flexibility consistent with safety and assured separa-
tion."117 It is therefore important that adequate procedures and
equipment are implemented so that the benefits of free flight
are not lost in delays around airports and on the ground.1 "
1. Pre-Flight Planning
Simply, flight planning is an estimation of a plane's perform-
ance under anticipated conditions." 9 In a free flight system,
conflicts could arise if proposed flight plans are hindered or
conflict. The RTCA task force recommends developing proce-
dures and equipment to provide feedback to flight planners
prior to departure. 20 Feedback needed by flight planners in-
cludes "potential impacts of requested flight plans, changes to
requested flight plans, and systems constraints causing those
changes."' 2'
The task force suggests that the process of planning a flight
begins hours before the flight actually departs. As departure
time approaches, planning proceeds with increasing detail.
Such details include: alternate plans if the original flight plan is
rejected, other airports to divert to in an emergency, the flight's
relationship to other flights, maintenance considerations, air-
port restrictions, and weather conditions at both arrival and de-
parture airports as well as conditions along the route. 2 2
Because planning a flight involves so many different considera-
115 Id.
116 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 36.
117 Id. at 37.
118 Id.
"9 Id. at 41.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 42.
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tions as well as people (air traffic control and others), the task
force suggests flight planning
[S] hould be thought of as the collection of three processes: a)
Operations planning-the activities that affect the operation of
the overall flight schedule; b) Mission planning-those things
considered in the total operating plan for an individual flight; c)
[User Preferred Trajectory] selection-the actual aircraft per-
formance calculation given the anticipated weather. 123
2. Collaborative Decision-Making
Task Force 3 is also concerned with the exchange of informa-
tion between airspace users and the FAA allowing for users to be
involved in the decision process.1 24 The task force believes solu-
tions to proposals will then be more agreeable to everyone
involved.
In the Final Report, Task Force 3 suggests that improved tele-
communications should be made available "to enhance the free
flow of information between users and the Traffic Flow Manage-
ment system." 12 5 In this way, system users will be able to better
plan their operations and reduce traffic problems. The task
force recommends that the FAA provide users with such infor-
mation as in-flight flight progress, airport configurations, SUA
utilization, and arrival slot times.12 6 Examples of the kind of in-
formation users should provide to the FAA include accurate
flight data such as flight plan updates, user priorities, and user
responses on how to meet system constraints. 127
3. Controlled Time of Arrival
It is assumed there must be some authority that can restrict
resources when they become, or could become, overloaded.12
The RTCA task force sees the Air Traffic Control System Com-
mand Center as the logical choice, and should cooperate with
local air traffic management. 12 9 Where there is a constrained
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 Id. at 43.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 44. Presently, the usual method for resolving airport constraints is for
the control center to implement a ground delay program, which, the Task Force
has determined, needs to be more flexible. Id.
129 Id.
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airport, pilots and controllers have many resources that should
be included in deciding how to handle the problem.130
One example the task force provides is in the case of weather
problems, and the task force believes airline meteorologists
should be a component in determining the potential severity or
duration of problems.13 1 This would then be used by air traffic
management to determine appropriate rates of arrival and how
long those rates should last.1 2
Task Force 3 has suggested two ways to accomplish its goal of
addressing constraints within the system while providing more
flexibility to system users. 133 The airspace user must be involved
in the planning process and then may be able to use their re-
sources to help solve the problem.13 4 Also, airspace users can be
assigned specific percentages of arrival slots per period of
time-for example, fifteen minutes.1 33
4. Handling Uncertainty in Arrival Rates
Despite careful planning, there will be instances where FAA
decisions will not mirror the user's intentions. For instance, the
FAA may decide the rate at which a plane may arrive at an air-
port and how long that arrival rate must last. These rates may
conflict, however, with the user's intentions. The task force rec-
ognizes that the system must be designed to allow the user's op-
erational objectives to still be met.13 6
To reach the desired flexibility, certain airports have imple-
mented the Managed Arrival Reservoir program which removes
unnecessary restrictions into the airport.' Task Force 3 be-
lieves that if this type of program were expanded to all airports,









137 Id. at 45.
13 Id.
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5. Terminal and Approach
Terminal areas contain departure, arrival, and tower low level
operations, creating a high "dynamic density."13 9 Such terminal
areas use radar surveillance and published standard routes for
transition to and from the en route structure.14° Controller di-
rected routes are used to separate over-flying traffic and traffic
operating off published routes, and to establish arrival sequenc-
ing and spacing. 41 Inherent limits of air traffic control, danger-
ous weather situations, and demand create substantial delays in
arrival and departure, while passing traffic is directed around,
rather than through, airspace around terminals.1 4 2
Dynamic density is defined by the "essential factors affecting
conflict rate in both the en route and terminal airspace. "143
These factors are: traffic density, a count of the number of air-
craft in, or projected to be in, a given volume of airspace; com-
plexity of flow, the controller workload resulting from flows in
traffic; and separation standards. 14 It is generally accepted that
dynamic density will increase in terminal airspace, especially in
the vicinity of hub airports.1 45 This is caused by the concentra-
tion of traffic in these areas as well as a number of other factors,
for example, closely spaced airports, wide performance differ-
ences between classes of aircraft, and significant weather in the
vicinity of an airport. Reduced horizontal separation standards
resulting from a Global Positioning System (GPS) derived posi-
tion and the capabilities of airborne and ground automation
can somewhat offset this trend toward higher dynamic
densities. 146
The task force recommends that the FAA should facilitate the
implementation of necessary technology and capability to im-
prove transition to and operation in airspace around terminals,
including the ability to handle aircraft arriving on unstructured
routes.1 47 Additionally, the FAA should encourage the move-




143 Id. at 31.
14 Id.
145 Id. at 37.
14 Id.; see discussion infra part II.F.
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ment of developed elements of such technologies and capabili-
ties out of research and development, into implementation. 1
By the turn of the century, Task Force 3 projects that a "uni-
versal standard instrument approach concept" will be available
at most airports. 149 "Aircraft would arrive from all points of the
compass, in a clean configuration, with an optimum-power de-
scent from cruise altitude."15 0 The task force sees benefits in-
cluding less time in terminal areas, which will result in
reductions in noise disturbances, fuel burn, and published ap-
proaches and charts, while increasing airport capacity and flexi-
bility to accommodate weather situations. 51
F. THE TECHNOLOGY
The system currently uses radar to track planes in flight.15 2
One problem with the use of radar is that radar cannot always
keep track of a plane if it flies behind a mountain or into bad
weather.1 53 Air traffic controllers, however, know the general lo-
cation of the aircraft because the plane is following an assigned
route."M Because of the imprecise nature of radar, air traffic
controllers spend much of their time verifying an aircraft's loca-
tion, speed, altitude, and instructions to pilots, instead of pro-
viding an efficient route to pilots.155
The cornerstone of free flight is technology, 56 which may re-
quire a potential investment of billions of dollars in improved
satellites and communications systems to replace the current,
inefficient radar-based system. 57 "New equipment will have to
be added for pilots and controllers and procedures developed
to accommodate both the tightly controlled and flexible aspects
of free flight."' 58 Advanced technology available now and in the
future will provide exceptionally reliable information for users,
both on the ground and in the air.159
148 Id.
149 Id. at 39.
150 Id.
151 Id.
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The use of automation will effectively shift control of air traf-
fic from ground-based radar systems "to computers high over
the Earth."160 New and upgraded equipment will have to be ad-
ded for pilots and controllers to take advantage of all aspects of
free flight.16 1 "This technology must be able to identify conflicts
and rapidly communicate required actions to the controller and
the aircraft."162 As the industry becomes more technologically
equipped, separation standards can be reduced withoutjeopard-
izing safety or increasing capacity in the system.16
One example of the benefits of such improved technology
can be seen in Australia. In a single period in Australian con-
trolled airspace, there were forty-seven reported instances of
"separation breakdown" between two or more aircraft.164 Dur-
ing that same period of time, 168 incidents were reported which
involved scheduled and non-scheduled flights. "In ten of the
events, traffic-alert and collision avoidance systems (TCAS) on
aircraft were credited with a positive role at least in resolving a
conflict. " 16 5
The basic requirements for free flight equipment include pre-
cise navigation, reliable communication links, and detection
and avoidance of possible collisions. 66 The intended system of
free flight revolves around the assumption that a significant
number of participating aircraft will be equipped with the navi-
gation and communication technology. 1 7 FAA officials claim
most of the required technology for free flight, such as high-
speed data links and satellite communications, is already avail-
able, or could be developed without much trouble. 68 The avail-
ability of data-linked information (such as textual and graphic
display of weather, SUA status, traffic, and airport capacity) in
the cockpit would provide more current information on which
160 Howe, supra note 27, at 1.
161 Nordwall, supra note 94, at 38.
162 RTCA CoMmrrrE REPORT, supra note 63, at 8.
163 Industry Says Free light Technology Could Save Airlines Billions a Year, supra
note 23, at 152.
164 David Learmount, The Future's Controller, FUGHT INT'L, Oct. 11, 1995, at 20.
165 Id. Australian aircraft are not required to be equipped with traffic-alert and
collision avoidance systems. Id.
166 Michael A. Domheim, Equipment Will Not Prevent Free Right, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 44.
167 See generally Sweetman, supra note 49, at 57.
168 Lunsford, supra note 1, at 30A.
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to make decisions, and during periods of poor weather, would
result in safer and more efficient operations. 16 9
The central component of free flight technology is the Global
Positioning System (GPS), originally developed by the Depart-
ment of Defense. 171 Use of the GPS as a navigational aid in avia-
tion became official in February of 1994 when the FAA
announced GPS equipment would become part of the National
Airspace System.1 71 The Global Positioning System allows for
the precise tracking of planes through the system's location co-
ordinates that send information to computers on the ground.1 72
By using GPS to relay information, instead of relying on ground-
based radio signals as aircraft do today, pilots will be able to fly
directly from their departure site to their destination.17 3 The
Federal Aviation Administration has announced plans to de-
velop a network of stations nationwide to receive navigation data
from GPS satellites and is intending to spend $475 million on
the development.174
The automation component on the ground is a conflict
probe. The conflict probe is a software package that basically
detects any potential contacts between aircraft alert zones.175
The conflict probe will continue to monitor the aircraft and will
project if the intentions of aircraft within its sector will con-
flict.' 76 If the conflict probe projects a possible contact between
the protected zones of aircraft, it will propose a course of action
which, depending on the controller's assessment, will be given
to the aircraft.177
Additionally, planes are equipped with Traffic Alert and Colli-
sion Avoidance Systems. '7  This system gives pilots warnings
when other aircraft fly close by.179 In fact, this system has been
considered standard equipment in aircraft cockpits since the
1980s. 80
169 TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 38.
170 Dan Palumbo, Digital Avionics, AEROSPACE AM., Dec. 1994, at 42.
171 Id.
172 FAA May Let Airlines Set Own Flight Paths, supra note 46, at 1.
173 Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.
174 Id.
171 Sweetman, supra note 49, at 57.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 FAA May Let Airlines Set Own Flight Paths, supra note 46, at 1.
17 Id.
180 Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.
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The drawback to all of this technology is in its expense. This
is certainly the concern of general aviation users who fear they
will have to add expensive equipment, or else not be entitled to
the benefits of free flight.'" In fact, FAA funding in 1998 does
not look good.18 2 Specifically, there is no money available for
development of data link, the key to free flight.18
The intent of free flight, however, is to improve efficiency,
thus reducing operators' costs.184 The Federal Aviation Admin-
istration believes the expense should be offset by the savings of
free flight, and the RTCA wants to see free flight available to all
areas of aviation.8 5 However, "no additional restrictions will be
imposed on those who choose not to equip their aircraft" for
free flight.8 6 The FAA and RTCA strongly believe free flight
will pay for itself, but for those who do not find benefits in free
flight, traditional air traffic control will not disappear.8 7
G. IMPLEMENTING FR.E FLIGHT
As the idea of free flight begins to take root, the FAA will be-
gin implementing a formal plan of transition. The task of im-
plementing free flight nationwide, however, will probably prove
to be more difficult politically than technically. 88 The FAA will
likely take its direction from the Final Report of Task Force 3.189
One of the recommendations of the task force was for the FAA
to establish a government-industry steering committee within six
months of receiving the final report. 90
However, a general idea of the direction the FAA must take is
apparent. Implementation will begin by working with the cur-
rent system, problems and all.'' Even though use of new tech-
181 Bruce D. Nordwall, Free Flight Could Stall Without Ky Data Link, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., June 3, 1996, at 28.
182 Id.
185 Id.
184 CNN Broadcast, supra note 10.
185 Id.
186 RTCA COMMirEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 5.
187 Bradley, supra note 8, at 90.
188 R. Michael Baiada, ATC System Biggest Drag on Airline Productivity, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 51.
189 See generally TASK FORCE 3 FINAL REPORT, supra note 67 (discussing free
flight implementation and safety).
19o Id. at 2; Industry Task Force Report is "First Class", supra note 70, at 1.
191 Neil Planzer & Margaret T. Jenny, Managing the Evolution to Free Flight, J. AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL, Mar. 1995, at 18, 20. See generally RTCA COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 63, at 13-18; Free Flight Roadmap (visited Sept. 22, 1996) <http://
asd.orlab.faa.gov/files/ffmap.htm>.
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nology is critical to free flight, the real key is in the change in
philosophy implementation will require.1 92 The aviation indus-
try, particularly air traffic controllers, must move from the con-
cept of controlling air traffic to managing air traffic. 193 The key
to managing this philosophical shift and implementing free
flight nationwide is to develop a workable structure of develop-
ment for the FAA to handle different, simultaneous improve-
ments to the current system.194
To properly employ the technology of free flight, the FAA will
need to specifically define the needs of the system's users and
develop procedures to address those needs.1 95 At the same time,
the FAA will define the technology needed for air traffic manag-
ers to provide the users' required services.1 96 Before providing
the technology, extensive simulation of methods of providing
automation, dependent on input from users, will be studied.1 97
This evaluation and validation of the requirements of free flight
will occur at the same time for the different regions of the
changing system.198 The result will be a model of the specific
function and performance specifications of the automation re-
quired, as well as guidelines for development.1 99
The first region of implementation will be the area of the Pa-
cific Ocean, between the continental United States and Hawaii,
an area called the Central Pacific Oceanic Transition. ° Imple-
mentation will then shift to the mainland, where the FAA will
reduce separation standards in domestic en route operations.0
Finally, development of the new air traffic management system
will shift to domestic cruise transitions, then to airport areas.0 2
H. THE NATIONAL RouTE PROGRAM
One example of the gradual transition to free flight the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration is making has been underway in
the United States for several years now. 203 The National Route
192 Bradley, supra note 8, at 90.
193 Id.
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Program (NRP) was implemented in late 1990 as part of a joint
agency-industry effort.204 The goal of the program, which has
been slowly expanded over the last four years, is to allow more
freedom for aircraft in their routing at higher altitudes. 20 5 Par-
ticipation, however, has been limited to routes between certain
select pairs of cities, with a minimum distance of 1500 miles be-
tween cities.20 6 The National Route Program allows airlines to
pick the most efficient routes between the 104 designated pairs
of cities, and file their plans with the FAA. 20 7
The biggest steps have been taken since January 1995, when
the FAA announced that commercial aircraft at 39,000 feet or
above, and more than 200 miles away from their arrival and de-
parture points, could fly any route the airline determined and
filed with the FAA. 20 8 The flight levels were gradually reduced
to 35,000 feet east of the Mississippi River and 33,000 feet west
of the Mississippi River by the summer of 1995.209 The FAA an-
nounced a moratorium through October 1995 to study the re-
sults of this staged enhancement.2 10 Jack Ryan, vice president of
air traffic management for the Air Transport Association (ATA)
reported that up to the moratorium, the ATA had been pleased
with the results. 2 11
Even with restrictions in place, the FAA believes the National
Route Program has been very successful,2 12 estimating industry-
wide savings at $40 million in 1995.218 Ryan stated some FAA
officials were surprised at the savings, but the airlines claim they
have always known there could be large savings in improved
management of air traffic control.214
The Air Transport Association reports one airline claims that
the National Route Program has resulted in savings for that car-
rier of nearly a quarter of a million dollars over a three-week
204 Industy Says Free Night Technology Could Save Airlines Billions a Year, supra
note 23, at 152.
205 Nordwall, supra note 94, at 39.
26 Id.
207 Linda H. Daschle, FAA Deputy Administrator, The National Route Program
(visited Oct. 24, 1995) <http://www.orlab.faa.gov/freeflit/FFDaschl.ham>.
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period. 15 If that amount is accurate, a projected savings forjust
one airline could total $3.4 million over a full year. 16 Bill Jef-
fers, FAA associate administrator for air traffic, stated that the
ATA claimed an estimated net savings of about $4.3 million in
fuel for 20,000 flights over one year as a result of the NRP 17
Jeffers also said, "We feel comfortable in saying that the Na-
tional Route Program has been a success, creating significant
fuel and cost savings and reducing flight time in increasingly
larger amounts, while maintaining the safety of the passengers
in the flying system."21 8
Some observers have suggested the real, hidden value of the
National Route Program may appear down the road, as airlines
realize the benefits of much more efficient crew utilization. 19
This would result because pilot contracts often require that the
pilot be paid based on scheduled flight times, and as airlines are
able to take a few minutes off a popular route, there may be
additional savings. As the industry focuses on on-time perform-
ance, however, the potential savings from labor contracts may be
outweighed by the threat of late arrivals.2
While the "high-flyers" have recognized the benefits of the
National Route Program, the general aviation community has
yet to see the economic value of the program. 2 Using the NRP
and implementing a fuel-saving program presents an interesting
paradox for small carriers. 2  The small carriers may be able to
realize the benefits of unrestricted flight, but the cost of re-
search and implementation is daunting.225
The National Route Program is not without its critics. Several
dispatchers at various airlines allege that many air traffic con-
trollers are not willing to make the effort to make NRP a success,
despite the FAA's claims.2 2 4 Those dispatchers claim their pro-
posed routes are routinely rejected by air traffic control cen-
ters. 25 One large carrier recently calculated the "savings not
215 Daschle, supra note 207.
216 Id.
217 Industry Says Free Flight Technology Could Save Airlines Billions a Year, supra
note 23, at 152.
218 Id.
219 See McGee, supra note 9, at 46.
220 Id.
221 Nordwall, supra note 94, at 39.





realized" due to non-fully-implemented new routes allowed
under the NRP and determined that in just one month the air-
line could have saved an equivalent of almost 500,000 pounds of
fuel.2 The implementation of programs such as the NRP can-
not be effective if mandatory compliance of air traffic control is
not implemented as well.2 7
Major airlines feel the NRP is long overdue .2 2  Giles O'Keefe,
chief dispatcher for Northwest Airlines, explains that the pro-
gram returns asset management to the airlines' control where,
he claims, it belongs. 9 O'Keefe analogizes, "If you're driving to
work, you don't want the [Department of Transportation] to de-
cide which route you're going to take." 23 0
The FAA has plans to further reduce restrictions at the busi-
est, lower levels of flight.2 3 ' Before a reduction is implemented,
each reduction is discussed and negotiated with the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA).232 Memorandums of
understanding of the new reduction are signed and distributed
in each case.23
Negotiations with the controllers' union may be in jeopardy,
however, because the union is resisting free flight, warning con-
trol towers and centers could become overloaded by the new
system.2 4 As a result, NATCA has refused to participate in de-
velopment of the National Route Program for the eastern air
traffic control centers after radar blackouts and computer fail-
ures occurred throughout the summer of 1995.25 Michael Con-
nor, director of safety and technology for the union, stated their
concerns include controller workloads, airspace capacity, and a
lack of tools to aid controllers in directing free flight traffic.2 3 6
NATCA claims to have been assured controllers would be pro-
vided tools to predict in advance when a sector of airspace






231 James Ott, Airlines, General Aviation Weigh Time/Cost Issues, AVIATION WYL &
SPAcE TECH., July 31, 1995, at 41, 42.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 David Field, A Warning from the Control Tower; Policy Letting Pilots Choose flight
Paths Called Unsafe, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1995, at Al.
235 Id.
236 Id.
1997] FREE FLIGHT 939
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and computer modeling done for the FAA by the Center for
Naval Analysis does not indicate such problems.3 7 FAA spokes-
woman Sandra Allen says the FAA is surprised by the union's
position because the FAA has worked closely with the union in
developing the NRP and intends to continue to do so. 238
III. THE FREE FLIGHT DEBATE
A. BENERTS
The benefits derived from free flight vary, depending on
whom you ask. James K. Coyne, president of the National Air
Transportation Association, testified before a congressional sub-
committee that under free flight, the benefits present them-
selves in terms of improved safety.2 39 Pilots will have access to
current and accurate information that is important to safety,
while gaining access to that information more quickly, before
serious problems arise. 4 ° Coyne stated the two biggest safety
concerns among pilots are bad weather and faltering equip-
ment.2 41 Free flight will allow pilots to avoid weather situations
and put necessary information in front of them in an emer-
gency, instead of potentially distracting pilots with controllers'
communications. 42 Basically, the technology available today al-
lows aircraft operators to not only increase safety, but also to
take operational control and flexibility over a flight.2 43
In terms of fuel savings and flight time, some of the most strik-
ing savings have been recognized on international routes. 2 1
Western Airlines reported that relaxing restrictions in such
countries as China and the former Soviet Union has literally al-
lowed the airline to chart new territory. 45 In some instances,
the airline claimed, as much as two hours in flight time were
saved.24
The most popular terms of free flight benefits, however, are
in the form of numbers-specifically, the amount of money air-
craft operators can save by participating in free flight. In theory,
237 Id.
238 Id.
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a free flight system would improve punctuality and cut down
flight times by as much as twenty percent.2 47 One NASA study
estimates an annual savings of $4 billion by 2005.48 Translated
into time savings per passenger, another study has suggested a
potential savings of $100 per minute for a planeload of
people. 49
This relates directly to an airlines' savings. As Coyne testified,
"[E]ven if the average time saved was only three to five percent
per flight, the total saving[s] would be hundreds of millions of
dollars per year. As he explained, aircraft expenses are gen-
erally considered in terms of "hours flown." 2 51 The smallest
planes expend thirty to forty dollars an hour, while larger planes
can run from five to ten thousand dollars an hour.2 2 Coyne
emphasized free flight will result in significantly reduced travel
costs.2 53 Furthermore, other than time savings, free flight bene-
fits also encompass savings from more efficient use of fuel.
254
Computer simulations of a free flight system serve to confirm
proponents' expectations. In these models, the new system re-
duced flight times and improved efficiency.2 -5 For example, the
FAA in one test ran an entire day's operational data (June 14,
1994) through a computer model of free flight.2 56 In that simu-
lation, where approximately 45,000 flights operated on opti-
mized routes, the model demonstrated a more even distribution
of traffic than the current system, and thus a reduced number of
"choke points."2 57 There were also a lower number of "proxim-
ity events" and flights arrived an average of 110 seconds ahead
of schedule.25 8
One study performed by navigation equipment manufacturer
Rockwell Collins determined that in 1993 the airlines lost up to
247 "Free Right"for Airliners Proposal Under Study in US, STRAITS TIMES (Singa-
pore), Oct. 16, 1995, at 4.
248 "Free Right" Will End Bottlenecks, Save Time, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), May 5,
1996, at 7E.
249 Id.
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$155 million due to indirect routings.2 59 The FAA claims air-
lines could reduce flight times by twenty percent on many
flights.2 6 This would result in a potential savings of $5 billion
annually by 2010.261
Specific estimates for the major airlines vary. Jack Ryan, of Air
Transportation Systems, estimates the nation's airlines could
save over $1 million a day.2 6 2 Michael Boyd, president of Avia-
tion Research Corporation, sees the monetary benefits of a fully
implemented free flight system as saving U.S. carriers $5 billion
annually.263
Finally, as Coyne testified, a free flight system will make flying
easier to learn and more affordable.2 Coyne sees free flight as
encouraging the development of technologically advanced air-
craft, thus encouraging employment and industry growth.2 65 Ul-
timately, additional benefits are expected over time as reduced
separation standards are accomplished, thus reducing flight
time and fuel usage. 66
B. CONCERNS ABOUT FREE FLIGHT
There are still many people in aviation who have legitimate
concerns about free flight. The most common concern is safety,
even though supporters of free flight, such as R. Michael Baiada,
a United pilot and consultant, believe free flight will actually im-
prove safety in aviation because planes will no longer be fun-
neled into the same few routes. 67 The difficult task that
concerns many is what will happen when planes are turned
loose from air traffic controllers' constant management.2 6
Some who question free flight, such as the primary pilots and air
traffic unions, believe there is already an element of chaos in the
current system and that the chaos will worsen when that system
is removed.2 69
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Andrew Cantwell, president of the Miami chapter of the Na-
tional Air Traffic Controllers Association, told the Miami Herald,
"We have serious safety concerns about free flight."2 70 He also
feels there should be more safeguards to guarantee safety.2 7'
James Kidd, an air traffic controller at the air traffic control
center in Leesburg, Virginia, compared free flight with driving
through a parking lot with no rules for the road.272 Kidd em-
phasized this scenario will occur at 30,000 feet, "and it's a long
way down."273
The promise of new technology has generated much of the
concern over free flight. In fact, automation advances are the
key to mature free flight.2 74 The FAA has promised it will not
put new designs or systems in place until the agency is sure it
can be done safely.275 As one NATCA representative pointed
out, however, no one has considered what happens when the
technology breaks down.276
Applying new technology to the system will bring up human
factors, which must be routinely considered in aviation.2 " This
concern applies both to controllers and pilots alike because peo-
ple can become too dependent on technology, which may affect
how people recognize and respond to problems. 78 Some argue
too much emphasis is being placed on new technology without
properly addressing free flight's effects on human perform-
ance. 2 79 Without doubt, there is still much work to be done in
this area. 8 °
It has been questioned whether the proficiency of controllers
in the new technology will be a problem.281 Despite this con-
cern, however, the free flight concept implies automation will
270 Chardy, supra note 18, at A16.
271 Id.; see also Ellen N. Perlmutter, Pilot-Controlled Flight Plans at Issue, PIrrTs-
BURGH Posr-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1996, at A-14.
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only serve to help controllers do their jobs better, not replace
their reasoning process. 2
As for pilots, the new equipment on planes is considered to be
more reliable and helps pilots by relieving them of routing re-
sponsibilities that may prevent them from attending to more im-
portant matters. 3  Also, advanced automation can keep a plane
closer to its intended route than the pilot can. 4 Of course,
airlines like the equipment because it cuts costs while increasing
safety.2 ' 5 United Airlines' head of pilot training William H.
Traub feels it is a safer system because there have been no devia-
tions from assigned paths of more than 300 feet since 1982 in
the highly automated Boeing 767.6 In fact, one argument for
advanced automation is that each aircraft accident can be traced
to human error in some form. 7 Therefore, if the chance for
human error is lessened, safety is increased. 8
However, Dr. Earl L. Weiner, an expert in pilot performance
at the University of Miami, has raised the point perhaps every-
one is thinking: "What happens when the automation fails? A
collision is coming between very inexperienced pilots and very
sophisticated aircraft."2 9
Pilots are also the focus of human factors questions. As highly
automated planes become more common, researchers are con-
cerned the equipment will be relied on too heavily and pilots
will never develop, or may lose, the skills needed in emergency
situations.2 11 "We're taking more and more of those functions
out of human control and giving them to the machines. The
question becomes whether humans will really respond when
something goes wrong. "291
Another concern is the complacency and boredom of a
plane's crew. This problem is emphasized by a separate study of
automation and pilot performance commissioned by the airline
282 Id.
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industry. 9 ' Bob Buley, a flight standards manager at Northwest
Airlines, stated that if the crew is subordinated to advanced
automation, then a certain amount of creativity is lost that may
be important in an emergency.2 93 Even those proponents of
highly automated planes have expressed concern that extensive
use of technology raises questions about a pilot's ability to re-
spond quickly in an emergency.2 94
One way this problem is being addressed is by pilot training
with simulators. As Dr. Foushee stated, "There have been many
simulator advances that hopefully will give pilots training advan-
tages that an older generation of pilots didn't have." 9 The sim-
ulators in use today can duplicate any movement a plane might
make, and pilots can therefore practice flying the automated
plane when different systems go down. 96
Yet another question raised by free flight is what happens at
the airport, when planes come in from different directions and
no longer have to wait their turn in line. As John O'Brien, rep-
resentative of the Air Line Pilots Association, stated, " [T] here's
only a certain amount of airplanes that can get into a runway in
a given amount of time. Free flight doesn't do anything for that
problem."2 97 Kidd hypothesized that under free flight, many air-
planes could arrive at an airport at the same time, and the con-
troller would be left to "sort out the resulting chaos."298 As he
points out, the planes will eventually have to line up because
only one plane can land at a time.299 At least with the current
system, there is no doubt the planes will be in line when they
land. oo
Controllers are specifically concerned with the results of free
flight as planes converge on major "hub" terminals. 1 Michael
Connor, director of safety and technology for the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association, echoed the concerns of Kidd:
292 Id.
293 Id. (statement of Bob Buley, Northwest Airlines).
294 Id.
295 Id.
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"At some point, the planes are going to have to get in line to
land, and you're right back to a traffic-jam situation."3 0 2
When implementing free flight, it must be remembered that
all aircraft must be figured into the equation-not just those
equipped for free flight-and there will always be wake
problems as well as poor weather conditions. 0 3 This concern is
well-founded when you consider that "over seventy percent of
commercial jet accidents that result in the loss of an aircraft
happen during approach, landing, surface operations, and take-
off."3 0 4 When this is considered with such problems as runway
incursions and controller error, the impact of these issues is
obvious.30 5
The FAA, however, is confident free flight will help, not hin-
der, the flow of traffic into airports. 36 Free flight will promise
that a wave of planes will not simultaneously arrive at an airport,
creating a traffic jam of airplanes.0 7 The idea of Traffic Flow
Management is that all planes destined for the same terminal
would send their estimated arrival time for the point where the
planes must merge together.3 0 8 The "ground organizer automa-
tion" considers all aircraft and replies with an arrival time as
close to the desired time as possible. 09 Each plane will arrive at
the merge point, even if the planes approach the airport from
many different directions.1 0
This system also allows for carriers to determine which planes
should be slated for approach first, one of the many complaints
raised by the industry.3 1' One author has posed the hypotheti-
cal situations of six planes operated by the same carrier inbound
to an airport and required to hold. 12 Under the new system,
the airline will be able to tell controllers which flights are the
most important to its schedule and should be allowed to land
first.313
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Finally, the roles of pilots and controllers in a free flight sys-
tem is questioned. Defining the varying roles and responsibili-
ties, "especially those of air traffic controllers," will be
difficult. 3 14 The change to free flight will require that responsi-
bility between controllers and pilots be shared, something con-
trollers are not used to.315
The responsibilities of air traffic controllers will change from
controlling flight to monitoring them and intervening only to
prevent problems, although the controller will remain central to
a safe system. 1 6 It has been argued that the controller's job will
be more challenging because the controller will have to deter-
mine when it is necessary to intervene. 17
Pilots claim they do not want primary responsibility for main-
taining separation standards for aircraft, and controllers do not
seem to want to relinquish the responsibility.3 18 Some control-
lers would consider sharing separation responsibility with pilots
unthinkable. 1 9
Byron Smith, an American Airlines pilot, said that while pilots
know free flight has the potential to save the industry a lot of
money, he and other pilots are wary of accepting increased re-
sponsibility while being required to operate increasingly compli-
cated planes.3 2 0 As Smith explained, "We really don't need
something else to keep up with, if it can be avoided."32' Sup-
porting Smith's claims, the Air Line Pilots Association and the
National Air Traffic Controllers Association have stated that
shifting the responsibility to pilots will increase the burden of
flying complex planes, an already demanding task.3 2
C. INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Free flight is interesting to the international community be-
cause the concept is at odds with traditional concepts of air traf-
fic control and management practices. The idea of free flight
"came as a great shock and surprise," said Brian O'Keefe, the
former head of the Future Air Navigation Systems committee at
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the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), when he
presented the concept of free flight at an aviation seminar in
Singapore. 23 Asian carriers, including Singapore Airlines, were
unfamiliar with the United States plan to research the possibili-
ties of free flight.324 O'Keefe explained that because fully imple-
mented free flight does not involve aircraft following established
routes or even flexible routes at established altitudes, "it is liter-
ally a 'foreign concept' to most aviation professionals." 325
While the United States continues to explore the possibilities
of free flight, Europe is taking a more cautious view. The region
not only has the world's most crowded and compact air traffic
environment, but also the most developed infrastructure on the
ground.326 While Europe does have plans for "augmented satel-
lite navigation," the timescale is less aggressive. 27 By 2005,
Global Navigation Satellite System 1, the initial, augmented sat-
ellite-based system, will be part of the European system, but the
need for ground-based aids through 2015 will be necessary,328
In Europe, air traffic specialists do not believe free flight will
ever work in such a high-density environment. 329 European
ideas focus on improving efficiency and depend on goals such as
developing closely parallel routes and reducing separation stan-
dards at cruise altitudes.33 0 Efforts of the European Civil Avia-
tion Conference (ECAC) and Eurocontrol include rationalizing
air traffic management under the European ATC Harmoniza-
tion Integration Program, or EATCHIP, and looking into ques-
tions of congestion.331 These efforts, rather than free flight, are
European priorities. 32
One advantage the United States has in implementing a sys-
tem such as free flight is that all of the airspace is under one
authority, while in Europe airspace use must be coordinated
through many national air traffic control authorities.333 One
323 David Hughes, Free Flight Sparks International Debate, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
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spokesman for the British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) sug-
gested free flight would be easier to implement in the United
States "because there is so much more airspace available."33 4 As
one official noted, there is little airspace available to maneuver
in, while all of Europe is a terminal area.3 5
The overall human resources job of Eurocontrol is to draw up
an "operating manual" to define air traffic control procedures
and standards, which every member nation will follow. 336 For
example, air traffic controllers in Europe will monitor sectors of
airspace by utilizing automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) as
well as radar, employ data-link technology to communicate, and
will have to monitor and maintain separation between aircraft
cleared for en route free flight. 337 How much freedom aircraft
are ultimately given in Europe is entirely dependent on the abil-
ity to analyze and understand the human capacities of air traffic
control.3 38
At meetings in June 1995 of all directors of civil aviation, how-
ever, the subject of free flight was not even on the agenda. 39
The route structure in Europe has been described as "a ball of
spaghetti" and "a problem of staggering proportions."3 10 It will
be difficult enough just to prove that parallel routes can be
safely implemented in European airspace, let alone free
flight.3 41 East European airspace may be more adaptable to free
flight, but problems in the region include a lack of civil aviation
infrastructure to support such operations. 42
While the primary objective of the RTCA task force was to
provide the Federal Aviation Authority Administrator with con-
sensus views regarding the implementation of free flight in the
United States national airspace, the broader goal is to produce a
seamless global air traffic management capability.3 43 In fact, the
task force received a major contribution to its study from repre-
sentatives of Airservices Australia and the Danish Civil Aviation
Authority and European Civil Aviation Conference. The rec
334 "Free Flight"for Airliners Proposal Under Study in US, supra note 247, at 4.
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ommendation of those contributors and that of the task force is
that substantial international participation in the new Steering
Committee, a primary recommendation of the task force to pick
up where the group left off, will have a salutary effect on future
efforts for developing universal global air traffic management.3 45
To that end, the task force recommends that this free flight
Steering Committee include appropriate international
representatives.3 4
However the United States proceeds, the nation is a signifi-
cant part of the ICAO North American Region and the FAA
needs to keep foreign operators using the National Airspace Sys-
tem up to speed on what the United States is doing.3 47 In fact,
the FAA should solicit international expertise and be able to an-
swer any concerns foreign operators may have during the devel-
opment and implementation of free flight.3 48
D. QUESTIONS OF LIABILITY
Once the Free Flight system is in place, the question becomes
who will be held responsible if something goes wrong. There is
much data available about the incidence of accidents involving
aircraft and the causes of those accidents. 3 49 Although there are
many causes of serious incidents, the primary cause is pilot neg-
ligence. 5 0 One estimate attributes to human error of the pilot
at least eighty percent of all aviation accidents.3 5 1
1. Pilot Liability
Currently, according to international convention, it is well ac-
cepted that ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of an
aircraft lies with the pilot.3 52 The Chicago Convention of 1944
states that "[t]he pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the
operation and safety of the aeroplane and for the safety of all
persons on board, during flight time."3 5 3 Most countries that
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have ratified the Chicago Convention have adopted this pre-
sumption of responsibility, and this is reflected in each country's
own air laws.S54
The United States is no exception. This standard has been
adopted as federal regulation which states that "the pilot in com-
mand of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final
authority as to, the operation of the aircraft." 5 5 The federal
courts often uphold this legislation strictly, finding that pilots
are directly responsible for the safety and well-being of their pas-
sengers and aircraft, and are the final authority regarding the
operation of their planes.3 5 6 At least one court has held that this
continuing duty may require the pilot to scan beyond the nor-
mal range of view and manipulate the aircraft to eliminate blind
spots caused by the aircraft. 57
Observers of court decisions regarding pilot liability believe
the pilot should always be held absolutely responsible for the
safety of his flight. 35  One author suggests this should be the
case because the pilot has special training and expertise, as well
as sophisticated technology which makes the pilot's job easier.3 59
Further, this responsibility includes the absolute authority of the
pilot regarding the flight throughout the flight, from take off to
landing.3 °
The regulatory system imposed on air traffic and adminis-
tered by the FAA is relied upon by pilots and controllers alike.361
This system relies on the assumption that the pilot has total con-
trol of the plane, completely understands the minimum estab-
lished criteria regarding the performance of the aircraft, and at
all times knows the speed, altitude, and location of the plane . 62
s54 Id. at 4.
155 Responsibility and Authority of the Pilot in Command, 14 C.F.R. § 91.3
(1996).
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The rule developed by this system makes sense since the pilot,
not air traffic control, is actually in the cockpit and is therefore
"in the best position to judge the correct course of action with
respect to that aircraft." 6 '
Applying this line of reasoning to the impending Free Flight
era, it could be argued then, that ultimate responsibility will re-
main with the pilot. Since pilots using United States airspace
were first required to receive federal certification in 1941, ad-
vances in technology have not changed or shifted the duties and
responsibilities of pilots to comply with Federal Aviation Re-
quirements (FARs). s Nor have the expectations of air traffic
controllers that pilots will comply with federal regulations have
not changed either.3 65 While technology has improved the air
traffic control system and made it more efficient, it has not
changed the pilot-in-command concept.3 6 Therefore, im-
proved technology should not shift to air traffic controllers the
pilot's burden to fly safely, nor should it cause air traffic control
to question a pilot's ability to use and rely on the cockpit's
instrumentation.3 67
2. Liability of Air Traffic Control
Air traffic control is not necessarily left out of litigation re-
garding aircraft accidents.3 6 The question of division of respon-
sibility regarding the safety of a flight is almost inevitable when
air traffic control is involved.3 69 Much of the case law suggests
that the pilot is not always going to be held responsible for an
accident. 370 Many federal judicial decisions have held air traffic
controllers at least partially liable in accidents involving air-
craft,371 while many courts have completely reversed the roles,
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giving primary responsibility for aviation accidents to air traffic
controllers.372
In Worthington v. United States,3 73 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found air traffic controllers negligent when a small pri-
vate plane crashed in a dense fog, killing the pilot and three
passengers. The court found that air traffic control failed to
provide the pilot with enough information to orient himself
with his instruments and surroundings in the fog.3 74 Adopting
the language of the Second Circuit, the Worthington court stated,
"[W] e are unable to conclude that the accident was not reason-
ably foreseeable as a result of the [controllers'] negligent failure
to provide up-to-date weather information."3 75 The court con-
sidered air traffic control the "original wrongdoer whose negli-
gence set in motion the entire chain of events which finally
culminated in the tragic crash," and found that "the [control-
lers'] negligence was ever present."376
The courts' willingness to hold controllers liable evidences
the fact that an air traffic controller's function under the pres-
ent system involves some amount of responsibility regarding safe
operation of aircraft, and does not serve simply in an advisory
capacity.377 It will be interesting to see if this view of controllers
changes as free flight is developed, since the FAA intends for air
traffic controllers to take on a more advisory role under that
system.
3. Manufacturer's Liability
One final question relates to what extent the manufacturers
and designers of the new free flight technology will be parties to
pilot, and that it was clear that the air traffic controllers had not operated accord-
ing to their duties prescribed in the Air Traffic Control Manual. The Manual is
used as the basis to test the duty of care owed by air traffic control in each partic-
ular case. The court concluded neither the pilot nor air traffic control properly
executed their respective responsibilities, but that the greater responsibility
rested with air traffic control. Id.
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suits arising out of accidents where their technology is in the
cockpit. It is not a new concept for aircraft parts manufacturers
to be brought into litigation where liability of aircraft designers
and manufacturers has been at issue. 78 It is likely then, that
new technology will expand the existing group of defendants.
IV. WHAT NEXT? CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
AND QUESTIONS
Task Force 3 has a very clear picture of how free flight should
work, and how the transition to free flight should progress. Un-
fortunately, the success or failure of free flight can not be fully
realized until free flight is fully implemented some ten to twenty
years down the road. During the interim period, problems with
the system are likely to arise.
One question that comes to mind is whether or not the driv-
ing force behind free flight will continue to push for its full im-
plementation. Sources within the FAA have recently disclosed
the fact that "there is an 'overwhelming inertia' against free
flight within the FAA."3 7 9 In fact, the FAA did not jump on the
free flight bandwagon until after individuals and independent
groups presented the issue to Congress. How much of the mo-
mentum behind free flight, then, is politically motivated? As in
any other government agency, some might question whether the
support for free flight will shift with the political winds of
change.
There is new concern that politics will force the FAA's plan
for implementation to take too long.380 One of free flight's ini-
tial proponents, R. Michael Baiada, believes free flight can be
implemented in the next four years for less than $500 million.
The FAA's plan requires $800 million only to replace control-
lers' monitors.3 8" ' The question exists, then, of why should air-
378 See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985),
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Beech Aircraft Corp., 777 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1985).
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space users be required to fund free flight implementation if
there are faster, less expensive possibilities available?382
A major voice in the push to free flight is the airline industry.
The major airlines have the ability to purchase the necessary
equipment while smaller airlines and general aviation may not
have the necessary capital. Also, those airlines may not have cus-
tomer bases that can handle the increased costs to consumers
such expenses will demand. It is possible the high "start-up"
cost of free flying will deter many from purchasing the technol-
ogy and will therefore be unable to take advantage of the new
system.
Major airlines believe they could recoup the cost from operat-
ing savings, but it might prove prohibitively expensive for pri-
vate pilots to link into the system. 83 Free flight is intended to
improve efficiency and, thereby, reduce costs for operators. To
the extent that equipping aircraft for operations in the free
flight environment costs money, the FAA believes that savings
must offset the expenses.8 4 The RTCA committee also stipu-
lated that free flight should be available to all segments of
aviation.8 5
The concept of free flight is being offered as a solution, and
will not be imposed upon the reluctant.38 6 Its crafters believe
firmly that the benefits of free flight will sell and pay for them-
selves. For those who can find no benefit, traditional air traffic
control is not going away. 8 7
Because the cost to airlines could be large, how will these
companies meet this expense? Too often in any customer-based
industry, increased costs means less customer service. Alterna-
tively, the increased costs to the airline could simply mean in-
creased costs to the consumer.
The nature of technology raises another interesting question.
Technology changes and is outdated at a very rapid pace. The
FAA has experienced this phenomenon in trying to update anti-
quated equipment. It is feasible that the technology purchased
by the government and by airlines today will be outdated long
before free flight is fully implemented. And, if technology
changes so quickly, at what pace will the FAA be able to keep up
382 A Better, Cheaper Plan for 'Free Right' Now, supra note 380, at 68.
383 Howe, supra note 27, at 1.
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with replacing and upgrading technology? In an era of budget
constraints, it may be unlikely.
Finally, what will be the effect of an aircraft accident when the
aircraft involved was "free flying"? As addressed above, there
may be tough questions of liability if responsibility for a flight is
changing from ground to cockpit. Possibly, lawsuits may have a
chilling effect on the desire for free flight. As it stands today, air
traffic controllers and pilots alike have expressed legitimate
safety concerns. Should the technology be found to be at fault,
what effect will this have on the development of such technol-
ogy? Arguably, development could be stalled and prices could
increase significantly.
Unfortunately, these questions cannot be answered until such
an incident happens. Overall, air travel in the United States is
considered unfailingly safe, and all parties involved will not act
without assurance free flight is as safe as the traditional method
of air traffic control. If the momentum behind free flight con-
tinues at its current pace on the path laid out by Task Force 3,
the FAA and the aviation industry will be flying high.
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